presentation. In short, the joke is an artwork. Not incidentally, Freud's subsequent interrogations of the dynamic of creative writing bear striking resemblances to his early model of joking.
The last is the motive for my own revisiting of Freud's book on joking more than a century apart. Scholars cagily use Freud in current reappraisals of modernist laughter, satire and humour; and yet, as Justus Nieland reminds us, Freud's theory of joking is quintessential for our understanding of modernism's laughter and its efforts to describe and re-inscribe the limits of the social world. 4 The reasons for this scholarly lacuna are complex. On the one hand, Freud's problematically gendered and hostility-peppered explanation of joke-production does not square well with the liberated gender consciousness that modernist scholars would like their subjects of inquiry to display. On the other hand, the status of this unusual book in Freud's oeuvre is also debated by psychoanalytic scholars: exactly how jocular was Freud when he decided to dedicate a full-length book to the subject of jokes? Most importantly, perhaps, the very relevance of investigating Freud's discussion of jokes in the context of modernist discourse on laughter has been overlooked. Holly Laird, for instance, perceptively suggests that, rather than being spontaneous, modernist laughter and nonsense were learned through both long practice and "overseriousness and disillusionment;" it is a stance that echoes, presumably unwittingly, Freud's focus on the artisanal skills he finds in the joke-production of disenchanted twentieth century humans. 5 More recently, Sara Crangle astutely traced in modernist laughter an impulse to intersubjectivity and interpreted it in the context of Emmanuel Levinas's thought; yet, remarkably, she did not comment on Freud's own insistence on intersubjective components in the joke-work. 6 In his seminal assessment of late modernism in terms of the deauthentication of the world through mirthless, self-reflexive laughter, Tyrus Miller, though, puts Freud to a specific use: Freud's discussion of ideational mimetics and the subcategory of jokes that we call smut provides Miller with an insight into how we might imagine the transitivity between disembodied textual forms and laughter as a bodily and social response. 7 Although limited to a few paragraphs, Miller's engagement with Freud's joke-text provides one with further food for thought. While Freud (in 1905 as well as in 1927) was interested in self-reflexive laughter and was more than aware of the loss of an "authentic" social ground in the proliferation of mimetic practices, his actual discussion of jokes seems to offer a picture of laughter situations that is diametrically opposed to Miller's account: for Freud, laughter and the comic, even when automated, reflexive, and deliberately detached from the body, are fundamentally linked to the processes that foreground, rather than attenuate, the subject-in-society. This particular paradox will be taken up in what follows and used to illuminate the complex dialogues between the theories of intersubjectivity, language, and joking, and their specific implications for modernist practices. Although Freud and Woolf would meet some thirty years later, it is reasonable to assume that neither of them knew much about the other's efforts in 1905. 8 Surprisingly, though, the two developed theories of the laughter situation which are markedly similar in intention. Notably, neither of them finds the dignified, decorous mode of humour serviceable in their arguments; instead, they profess interest in jokes and comedy, and everything else that may bring about "peals of laughter," grins, giggles, joyful wags, and even, in Woolf's proposal, the condition of risus puris, "pure laughter. As the joke's disposition towards being contagious is allotted a special significance in
"Daldaldal-daldaldal?" Social Dynamics of Jokes
Freud's Introduction to Jokes, it may be apposite to begin our enquiry here. "No one can be content with having made a joke for himself alone," Freud stresses. 12 Joking necessitates the participation of three parties: the teller, the addressee, and the super-addressee/subject. If the joke succeeds and laughter is elicited from the listener, the latter will transport it on, bringing forth further laughter. This laughing discharge rises from the unbinding, if only temporarily, of the energy that is cathected to an interiorly frustrating psychical path. 13 Freud's infamously gendered scenario of joke-production, then, reads as follows: a man encounters a desirable woman with whom he engages in a "wooing talk," perhaps in a presence of another man; the woman rejects or resists acknowledging the speaker's sexual intentions, and, once she has left the room, the man jokes about her with another male; the other acts first as an obstacle and, subsequently, as an audience for/accomplice in joking. The joke's aim of generating pleasure can thus be realised only in this third person, the listener, rather than in the joker or in the butt of the joke. 14 The psychic energy that has been used to repress emotions such as sexual desire and hostility is released in laughter and economically realigned. We derive pleasure from, simply, being more economical in our expenditure of psychic energy. The final result is a triumphant, if temporary, retrieval of the euphoric mood of childhood. 15 It is not hard to detect that sexist aggression underpins this dynamic, a circumstance of which Freud was conscious. 16 As many feminist critics and some psychoanalytic scholars have commented, "the third [female] term" in Freudian account of the joke-work seems to be "invoked only in the interest of the original [male] rivalry": the female subject is discarded and petrified in representation as soon as male exchange has been initiated. 17 These accusations are no laughing matter; and, as such, although they are not the focus of this article, they deserve to be addressed -especially if, in turn, they help us map a further social and conceptual territory of The intuited meaning of the sentence, the phonic contents of the adverbial clause, and the number of omitted syllables should all lead the respondent to guess the occluded phrase, spelling out possibility that, in a rush, the doctor may have misprescribed the medicine.
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What Brentano-and Freud following him-find significant in this riddle is arguably not its entertainment value; rather, it is the circumstance that the subject's words (riddle) acquire their meaning only in the mind of the receiver, a riddle-solving entity that completes the communicative act, i.e., makes it into a whole (solution). In this way the reception and responsive action become constitutive of the act itself. While this process is generally characteristic of riddles, "cut-up" riddles like this one are of special interest to Brentano-and Freud-because they foreground the relations of dependence between parts (participants) and a whole (a speech act, a riddle). This is a topic which Brentano had previously explored in are based on semantic intention and demand: they "intend" and they require a response.
Intersubjective and transmissible via social chains, Freudian jokes, like riddles, are shaped by what Freud calls, variably, a "conceptual connection" and a "method:" namely, a subtended term, which is either a direct allusion to the hidden/absent object of the joke (the woman who left the room, for example), or, else, a form of encircling that object analogically. 23 Intention, rather than (self-)reflection, is at the heart of joking. 24 The deepest, yet unrealizable, intention of joking is to provoke the absent object's (the hidden addressee's) reaction; this being impossible, the joke-work finds its realization in the listener's laughing response, and only in his/her response.
As Freud never tires of repeating, the act of joking is realized only in reception. 25 humour, where the alleviation of anxiety is realized through an individual's refusal to suffer-a process which can be completed within a single person-joking can accomplish its therapeutic function only in a community of at least three persons/entities. 35 The joke-work is "healing" not because it cathartically cancels its own incentives in the working out (since the incorrectness of a joke is precisely what transports it on), but because it assures the continuance of communication and ludic activity. The persistence of joking thus amounts to nothing less than the dynamic continuing of life, or the "continuation of the world," to adopt a fortunate phrase recently used by Caryl Emerson to describe the effect of Bakhtin's "carnival laughter." 36 How does it all reframe, then, our vision of that woman who had to leave the room in order for the joke to materialize? The lady may have vanished from sight yet she has anything but disappeared from the story; in fact, she is the story itself. As an important sideline to the argument I have drawn about the social function of jokes, her location in the joke triad reveals that we should understand the "gendering" in Freud's example of joke-work in a more nuanced way: as a repositioning which allots to woman a more significant social and creative role than a cursory reading of the notorious joke-scenario might suggest. On this interpretation, the superaddressee, or the "butt" of the tendentious joke (whatever its gender may be), could be seen as the real catalyst of social bonding, even the therapeutic "continuation of the world", and, as I
shall argue in what follows, the lever of aesthetic functioning under new conditions.
Joke-work and Aesthetic-work
Although the tendentious joke provides Freud with the most adequate exemplification of the joke-work, it is not its sole representative. As Freud emphasizes, tendentious jokes, in particular those belonging to the category of exposing or obscene jokes, are the "lower" class of jokes; with them, laughter gets thinner, and after the initial burst of pleasure, a new dissatisfaction sets in. In contrast, a joke of a higher class-an "innocent" or "conceptual" joke-has "an aim in itself," in its own technique: it disseminates pleasure and negotiates aggression via formal means, rather than through its object. 37 Thus another, complementary model of the joke-work is also espoused life." 41 Freud subjects Fischer's proposition to his own terms of inquiry, en route half-jokingly re-writing him: "We shall scarcely be contradicting this statement of Fischer's-we shall perhaps be doing no more than translating his thoughts into our mode of expression-if we insist that the joking activity should not, after all, be described as pointless or aimless, since it has the unmistakable aim of evoking pleasure in its hearers." 42 While he rejects Fischer's manifestoic aestheticism, Freud playfully rescues from it the concept of pleasure which orients his own inquiry, and in turn uses it to distinguish between different sources and ways of obtaining pleasure. He cogitates:
If we do not require our mental apparatus at the moment for supplying one of our indispensable satisfactions, we allow it itself to work in the direction of pleasure and we seek to derive pleasure from its own activity. I suspect that this is in general the condition that governs all aesthetic ideation [my emphasis], but I understand too little of aesthetics to try to enlarge on this statement. As regards joking, however, I can assert […] that it is an activity which aims at deriving pleasure from mental processes, whether intellectual or otherwise. 43 What facilitates this important turn in Freud's argumentation is not only Fischer's invocation of pleasure (the latter is anyway given a different treatment in Fischer) but the recognition of a correspondence between aesthetic production and the joke-work. Freud acknowledges the commensurability of the two activities, or-as the qualifying "all" may suggest-the subsuming of both activities under one general category, that which he would later label "phantasy activity." 44 At the end of this paragraph, Freud puts off the consideration of aesthetic activity in a characteristically self-conscious manner. In point of fact, he had already initiated this inquiry:
Freud's essay "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage," a text which discusses the workings of another aesthetic-social activity, theatre performance, had either already been written or was in the process of being written in 1905. 45 One easily recognizes the major characteristics of the joke-work in Freud's account of drama performance. The latter, according to Freud, requires three main constituents: the conflated instance of the performer-dramatist; the audience; and the subject-matter, or the object/super-addressee. In theatre performance the suppressed impulses struggle into consciousness, but, instead of being named, they are transformed, rendered in circuitous, formal ways. 46 Pleasure, whose nature is that of a fore-pleasure, results from this temporary lifting up of a psychic repression path. 47 Here, the pleasure is derived from an economy in expenditure similar to that found in joking: the spectacle-play ("Schau-spiel") saves us the expenditure on repression and opens up the occluded sources of enjoyment, doing for adults what play (Spiel) does for children. 48 The performative nature of both activities makes their affiliation palpable. This association was soon to be expanded into a general theory of correspondence between the jokework and creative writing. In "Creative Writers and Day-dreaming" Freud revisits the notion of formal "disguising" as the key element in the communication of phantasies. According to Freud, the process of creative writing starts when an experience in the present awakens in the writer a memory of an earlier personal or even transgenerational experience/phantasy. This situation creates, or awakens, a wish, the fulfilment of which the writer finds in creative work. The product, a work of art, "exhibits elements of the recent provoking occasion as well as the old memory," and it is this capacity of the arts to bear a "date-mark" [Zeitmarke], i.e., string together the present, past and future, that leads Freud to view art and literature (in both their popular and high forms) as the privileged keepers of the "screen memories" of humankind. 49 Furthermore,
Freud argues, a piece of creative writing overcomes repulsion which the disclosure of the writer's (or universal) phantasies would have otherwise produced by the aesthetic means of "altering and disguising." These grant readers aesthetic pleasure whose nature is that of an "incentive bonus," or a fore-pleasure. Our actual enjoyment in a literary work, then, proceeds from the deeper strata of our psyche-from "a liberation of tensions in our minds" and the chance to "enjoy our own day-dreams without self-reproach or shame." 50 Just like jokes, the arts are here arrogated a therapeutic role, based on their capacity to generate a non-(or less-)neurotic substitute satisfaction.
This dynamic is remarkably similar to the operation of joking. Specifically, there is a coincidence between the preliminary stages of the joke-work and creative writing and the two major groups of wishes, ambitious and erotic, to be fulfilled by these activities. The nature of the pleasure derived through joke-work and art-work is comparable, too: it is a technique-derived fore-pleasure, which serves as a necessary incentive for a deeper instinctual pleasure. In both cases, the result of activity is a more or less creative product, bearing traces of the unconscious drives and the phantasies and internalized object relations that gave rise to it. The psychological outcomes of writing, performing, and joking can all be subsumed under the category of "release"
and/or relief mechanisms, although in each of these cases-and contrary to common perception-there is no direct, or properly cathartic, release of subconscious desires themselves. Freud's tendentious jokes is, predictably, the desire to reverse some hierarchies through the discursive deflation of the augmented and the unobtainable. What interests me here, however, is the specific narrative effect through which this questioning of received hierarchies is achieved:
the proliferation of joking ludically reorganizes these texts into intersubjective conspiracies between the recipient/reader and the narrator, where the protagonist serves as the ostensible "butt" of the joke while the implicit target of the joke is, in fact, a figure or a system of authority.
This disguised target is narratively intimated through the simultaneous use of ideologically marked language such as officialese, military jargon, or elevated discourse. This marking of language can take a variety of forms: from the replication of specific jargon or reified vocabulary, through unnecessary repetition, oxymoronic sentence construction, and mixing of registers (often in the form of ironic distancing in parenthesis), to deliberately misplaced modifiers and mixed metaphors. In all these cases, the apparent "butt" of the joke serves as a facilitator of joke-work/language-work, which in itself points to the unspoken object of jocular critique.
The recognition of this specific function in turn helps us understand Freud's tendentious jokes, including his infamous sexual joke, in a new light, namely, as an operational speech triad.
As activities in which the deflection of libido enables creativity, joke-work and artistic production are connected precisely through this triadic functioning. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise, then, that the dialogic pattern of joke-formation finds expression in a wider variety of modernist texts, and even in those that, at the surface level at least, do not use parody or satire.
The activation of intersubjective joke-work in modernist fiction often relies on the specific figuration of the narrator as a droll interlocutor, who is overly sensitive to the limitations of their own practice and exuberantly appropriative of social discourses. This active narrator then both effectuates and embodies a reading-joking contract that we may see in operation in many Caragiale's, Alfred Jarry's and, later, Eugene Ionesco's theatrical treatments. A further cluster of jokes exteriorizes the fraught temporalities of modern times by using repetition, stutter, oxymoronic delay, and then sudden acceleration towards the pleasures of the portended punchline; these may be properly associated with the comic practice of one Samuel Beckett, as recently described by Laura Salisbury. 61 And because the joke-work, like creative writing and theatre performance, preserves and transmits in a disguised form the phantasy or social aberration that lies at its core, a corresponding artistic manipulation of the text, one which simultaneously occludes and sustains the social paradox, may be recognized in many Freudian jokes. Hilarious as they may be at times, these narratives and snippets of discourse often provoke an ambivalent response: we are uncertain whether we should laugh or cry at them. This discursive strategy is well known to the readers and scholars of modernist texts; modernist witticisms are more often than not inflected by pains and absurdities, historical and personal. The Finally, it may be out of sheer (jocular) enjoyment in repetitious verbal play that Freud cherishes the daldaldal riddle. In the Brentano-footnote the clarity of argumentation is exchanged for the rhythmic effect of the daldaldal. The parasemantic properties of the repeated sound "dal" overflow Freud's footnoted text to such an extent that this "aesthetic riddle" acquires more vivacity and remains more memorable than the tendentious sexual joke "O, na, nie," to which it is a note. 64 Such a wilful surrender to the rhythmic repetition of monosyllables, wherein the semantic fill-up is both invited and rendered absurd, became a signature trait of a range of modernist avant-garde practices, not the least the one whose name so closely resembles to establish a force-field within which different narrative frames will coalesce and clash in the ensuing pages. The dissemination and perpetual reanimation of these fragments-jokes in their various narrative modes-dialogizes the greater narrative, Freud's study itself. The latter now appears as a polyphonic text with strong intentionality and orientation towards reader-response.
The triadic organization of the text, one suddenly notices, holds the key to our understanding of Freud's thoughts on intersubjective processes in general, and the joke-work in particular.
There is much evidence that Freud was conscious of the innovativeness of his discursive practice, but one of his meta-textual statements is particularly illuminating in the present context.
In a self-reflexive moment in "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" 
